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Self-deception can evolve under appropriate costs 
Juan Camilo RAMÍREZ*, James A. R. MARSHALL 
Department of Computer Science, University of Sheffield, Sheffield S1 4DP, United Kingdom 
Abstract  Apparent biases in decision making by animals, including humans, seem to present an evolutionary puzzle, since one 
would expect decisions based on biased (unrealistic) information to be suboptimal. Although cognitive biases are hard to diag-
nose in real animals (Marshall et al., 2013b), we investigate Trivers' proposal that individuals should self-deceive first in order to 
better deceive others (Trivers, 2011). Although this proposal has been scrutinized extensively (Bandura et al., 2011) it has not 
been formally modelled. We present the first model designed to investigate Trivers' proposal. We introduce an extension to a re-
cent model of the evolution of self-deception (Johnson and Fowler, 2011). In the extended model individuals make decisions by 
taking directly into account the benefits and costs of each outcome and by choosing the course of action that can be estimated as 
the best with the information available. It is shown that in certain circumstances self-deceiving decision-makers are the most 
evolutionarily successful, even when there is no deception between these. In a further extension of this model individuals addi-
tionally exhibit deception biases and Trivers' premise (that effective deception is less physiologically costly with the aid of 
self-deception) is incorporated. It is shown that under Trivers' hypothesis natural selection favors individuals that self-deceive as 
they deceive others [Current Zoology 61 (2): 382–396, 2015]. 
Keywords  Self-deception, Deception, Overconfidence, Cognitive biases, Optimal decision-making, Optimal behavior 
Deception in animals (no conscious intention being 
implied) refers to the signaling of false information 
from one individual to another and is normally benefi-
cial to the signaller and detrimental to the receiver 
(Semple and McComb, 1996). For this reason some 
animals are observed to evolve strategies to deceive 
others, although natural selection is expected to also 
favor individuals who are able to 'see' through the de-
ception. In addition to this, signaling may also be costly 
in order to be considered reliable, for example in mating 
situations (Zahavi, 1975). Arms races may occur be-
tween deceivers (no conscious intention being implied) 
and deception-uncovering species, with each group un-
der selection to outsmart the other. Unlike deception, 
self-deception can be sensibly hypothesized not to be 
evolutionarily stable by itself, because animals who 
make decisions on false information seem more likely 
to make bad choices that could lead to negative conse-
quences, such as injury and death. Especially in situa-
tions where conflict is likely it is sensible to expect that 
self-deceiving individuals tend to make suboptimal de-
cisions, for instance risking injury through fighting a 
stronger opponent, and that in the long term they end up 
being less evolutionarily successful than others who use 
truthful information (Marshall et al., 2013b). Despite 
this, self-deception biases are claimed to occur fre-
quently. For instance, animals and humans sometimes 
behave as if their subjective confidence in their skills in 
a given moment is above the objective measure of such 
attributes (Svenson, 1981; McCormick et al., 1986; Pal-
lier et al., 2002; Alicke and Govorun, 2005). Surveys 
have shown most drivers rate their own skills as above 
average (Svenson, 1981; McCormick et al., 1986) and 
most students regard themselves as above-average lead-
ers (Alicke and Govorun, 2005). It has also been docu-
mented that people who are unskilled for a task often 
fail to recognize their lack of competence, a phenome-
non known as the Dunning-Kruger effect (Kruger and 
Dunning, 1999). Psychological tests have also shown 
that people tend to overestimate the probability of posi-
tive events (e.g., career success) and to underestimate 
the probability of negative events (e.g., onset of a se-
rious illness) (Sharot, 2011b). Additional studies have 
shown that these optimistic expectations are not neces-
sarily deterred by knowledge of past, realistic informa-
tion. For instance, newly married couples tend to over-
estimate the likelihood of having long marriages despite 
reported divorce rates of around 50% (Sharot, 2011a). 
Some stroke patients, who are aware of their condition, 
have been observed to deceive themselves into thinking 
that their paralysis is due to factors other than their ill-
ness (Ramachandran, 1996). Similar studies have found 
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that surveyed students also rate others as above average 
(Klar and Giladi, 1997). These results appear to show 
that individuals are generally unable to estimate corre-
ctly the average capability in a group (Brooks and Swann, 
2011; Chambers and Windschitl, 2004) and that they 
have a tendency to overestimate the skills of others. 
Self-deception has been defined as a misrepresenta-
tion of reality (Trivers, 2000). At its simplest, this 
would correspond to using a biased estimate of the pro-
bability of an event in decision-making. It generally 
comes in the form of a bias, which is a tendency to act 
prejudicedly or behave in a way that apparently does 
not conform to rationality. Biases can be of one of two 
types: cognitive biases, which are perceptual biases in 
the subjective experience of an individual, and behavio-
ral biases, which are manifest in behaviors that depart 
from the optimal fitness-maximizing strategy (Marshall 
et al., 2013b). Cognitive biases are generally hard to 
diagnose, and attempts to classify or explain them are 
often controversial (Dougherty et al., 1999; Marshall et 
al., 2013b). The apparent overconfidence exhibited by 
students and drivers in the surveys mentioned above are 
usually diagnosed by psychologists as an example of a 
cognitive bias (Svenson, 1981; McCormick et al., 1986; 
Pallier et al., 2002; Alicke and Govorun, 2005). Even 
though a bias may result in seemingly unreasonable 
behavior it could evolve if, for instance, the bias is part 
or the by-product of a larger behavioral trait that overall 
proves to be individually advantageous. Thus cognitive 
biases may evolve given appropriate decision machinery, 
whereas we expect behavioral biases not to. 
It has been proposed by Trivers (Trivers, 2011; von 
Hippel and Trivers, 2011b) that the most evolutionarily 
successful deceivers in nature are those that self-deceive 
first. That is to say, unconscious deceivers (i.e., those 
who unwittingly 'lie' to themselves just as they lie to 
others) are favored by natural selection over conscious 
deceivers (i.e., those who intentionally attempt to be 
deceitful while acting on truthful information). Trivers 
hypothesizes that this is because conscious deceivers 
have to pay a considerable cognitive cost in order to 
avoid exhibiting involuntary responses (e.g., blushing, 
nervousness, blinking, voice tone, etc.) that would allow 
others to see through the deception. On the other hand 
unconscious deceivers do not have to pay the same cog-
nitive cost and tend to be better cheaters because they 
do not exhibit the same involuntary responses, since 
they believe the lie. According to Trivers' theory a ten-
dency towards self-deception evolves as a supportive 
by-product of the ability to deceive others, and the cost 
of lying to oneself is outweighed by the benefit brought 
by the ability to lie convincingly to adversaries. The 
theory proposed by Trivers has received extensive dis-
cussion from different commentators (Bandura et al., 
2011) and Trivers has addressed these criticisms (von 
Hippel and Trivers, 2011a). One point that has been 
raised is that in situations of conflict, a deceiver may 
succeed in discouraging competitors from fighting (e.g., 
by feigning a strength higher than the actual one) but it 
is likely that at some point the deception may be unco-
vered by others and that then the deceiver will face se-
rious consequences, such as injury or death, as pointed 
out earlier (Marshall et al., 2013b; Frey and Voland, 
2011; Funder, 2011). In such case the eventual cost of 
being discovered may be higher than the advantage 
posed by deceiving others, and self-deception should 
not evolve. This point has not been addressed by Trivers 
(Marshall et al., 2013b). 
In Section 1.1 we extend a model of the evolution of 
overconfidence proposed by Johnson and Fowler (2011) 
in order to investigate the evolution of self-deception 
given statistically-optimal behavioral machinery. With 
this it is shown analytically and computationally that 
under certain circumstances overconfidence evolves 
even when decision-makers use a theoretically optimal 
decision rule as suggested by Marshall et al. (2013b). In 
this case overconfidence or underconfidence are cogni-
tive biases assuming a particular decision machinery, 
since they lead to optimal behavior, rather than a sub-    
optimal behavioral bias (Marshall et al., 2013b). The 
new model is extended in Section 1.2 to incorporate 
deception biases in order to test Trivers' theory (Trivers, 
2011) by showing that deception is favored by natural 
selection when self-deception reduces cognitive or other 
costs. These self-deception biases are shown to be evo-
lutionarily stable in a situation of conflict, one scenario 
not addressed by Trivers when replying to their critics 
(Marshall et al., 2013b; von Hippel and Trivers, 2011a). 
In the model presented in Section 1.1 individuals do not 
attempt to deceive others because the purpose is to 
compare the self-deception biases with (model in Sec-
tion 1.2) and without (model in Section 1.1) deception 
between individuals. Analysis and results of the models 
introduced in Section 1.1 and Section 1.2 are presented 
in Section 2.1 and Section 2.2, respectively. 
1  Materials and Methods 
1.1  A simplified owner-challenger model with   
internal biases 
In this section we present an extension to Johnson 
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and Fowler (J&F)'s model (Johnson and Fowler, 2011). 
In the model presented in this section, individuals 
self-deceive but do not deceive others. This extension, 
called the simplified owner-challenger model, is further 
extended in Section 1.2 to allow individuals to both 
self-deceive and deceive. The purpose of having the two 
models is to compare the level of self-deception that 
evolves in the absence of selective pressure to deceive 
others (in the simplified model presented in this section), 
and compare it with the level of self-deception that 
evolves when this selective pressure is present (in the 
generalized model presented in Section 1.2). 
The definition of the simplified owner-challenger 
model is similar to that of J&F's (Johnson and Fowler, 
2011) and can be formulated as follows. Each individual 
has a fighting capability, denoted by T, which is nor-
mally distributed with mean zero and standard deviation 
1 2 . Given any two individuals, i and j, with capabili-
ties Ti and Tj respectively, the former would defeat the 
latter if Ti > Tj should a conflict between them occur. 
The capability advantage i has over j is defined as A =  
Ti Tj, which, since normal variances are additive, is a 
standard normal random variable (i.e., A~N (0,1)). The 
marginal probability that i defeats j is thus given by pW 
= P(A > 0) = 1/2. 
Every individual i also has an internal bias (i.e., a 
self-deception bias), denoted by ki, that distorts its per-
ception of its own capability in such a manner that i 
always acts as if its capability is Ti + ki. In addition to 
this, i's perception of j's capability, denoted by ˆ jT , is 
normally-distributed with mean jT  and standard devia-
tion VH (i.e., ˆ ~ ( , )j jN HT T V ). The perception error size, 
VH, is a non-negative parameter of the model. In this 
manner the model simulates perception errors as they 
occur in nature, which are due in part to environmental 
factors beyond the control of each individual, as well as 
being due to sensory noise. In this manner the advan-
tage i perceives it has over an opponent j is given 
by ˆ ˆi i jA kT T   . 
A conflict between two individuals over a resource 
occurs in an owner-challenger encounter as shown in 
Fig. 1, where r is the value of the contested resource 
and c is a cost both individuals pay if they fight. The 
encounter involves the owner of the resource, who ar-
rives at it first, and a challenger, who arrives subse-
quently and decides whether to claim the resource. If 
the challenger claims the owner decides whether to fight 
for the resource or abandon it to the challenger. Both r 
and c are constant and positive, and each individual 
decides in sequence whether to fight or not. 
In a more realistic scenario, r, c, and VH would likely 
vary from individual to individual and from encounter 
to encounter. For instance, an individual who has col-
lected many resources will value a newly encountered 
resource less than an individual who has collected none. 
Similarly, the cost of a fight will probably be higher for 
an individual who has been injured badly from pre- 
 
 
 
Fig. 1  An owner-challenger encounter occurs when one individual is the owner of a resource and then a challenger arrives 
with the intention of claiming the resource 
Both parties decide asynchronously whether to fight over the resource or surrender it to the other individual. If both fight then both pay a cost c but 
the winner additionally receives the resource value r. The strongest individual wins the fight. If both have the same capability then the winner is 
decided randomly with each individual having equal probability of winning. 
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viously lost fights than for an individual who has lost 
none. In addition to this, in a natural scenario perceptual 
capabilities as well as conditions of the local environ-
ment (e.g., low visibility that affects the ability to vi-
sualize the opponent) would be likely to vary from en-
counter to encounter, resulting in different perception 
errors between individuals. However, r, c, and VH have 
been kept constant among all individuals for simplicity 
because in this manner the formal analysis of the model 
(Section 2.1) and a further extension (Section 1.2) of it 
are much more manageable and by doing so we identify 
minimal conditions that are sufficient for the evolution 
of the biases that we are interested in. 
There are two differences between the owner-chall-
enger model and the one proposed by J&F (Johnson and 
Fowler, 2011). The first is that in J&F's model the two 
competing individuals decide synchronously whether to 
fight or not whereas in the owner-challenger model the 
two decisions are made asynchronously and in sequence. 
The second is that in J&F's model individuals make 
their decisions based only on their perceived advantage 
over their respective opponents while ignoring the bene-
fits (r) and costs (c) of each decision, whereas in the 
owner-challenger model these variables are taken into 
account by each individual. In this manner, the owner-  
challenger model addresses two main criticisms of 
J&F's (Marshall et al., 2013a,b; Johnson and Fowler, 
2013). The first one is that since in J&F's model con-
tests over resources are synchronous they can lead to 
valuable resources remaining unclaimed if no individual 
chooses to contest them, while the second is that in 
J&F's model individuals use an arbitrary and unrealistic 
decision rule in deciding whether to contest (Marshall et 
al., 2013a,b). The first criticism is addressed by allow-
ing individuals to use whether they arrived at a resource 
first or second to determine their strategy, thereby crea-
ting a uncorrelated asymmetry (Maynard Smith, 1982) 
and allowing low value resources to be claimed by one 
individual. The second criticism is addressed by enab-
ling individuals to use the estimated payoffs associated 
with different outcomes, and an estimate of the proba-
bility of winning, to determine whether to contest a re-
source. 
A realistic scenario in the owner-challenger model is 
that where both individuals use all the relevant informa-
tion when making their respective decisions. However 
the mathematical analysis of the model becomes diffi-
cult when both decision-makers behave in this manner. 
For this reason we analyze first a simplified version of 
the model where the decision of the challenger j is al-
ways to claim the resource and fight whereas the owner 
i makes its decision (after having been challenged by j) 
by using the following reasoning; first i estimates its 
own probability of winning as ˆˆ ( )W j i ip P kT T   . 
Then i estimates its expected payoff from the hypothet-
ical fight as ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ( ) (1 )( )W W WF p r c p c p r c       . 
This individual then decides to defend the resource if 
and only if this estimated payoff is higher than zero. 
This in turn occurs if and only if ˆ /Wp c r! (Marshall 
et al., 2013b). This decision rule is rational from the 
perspective of an owner because it uses all the relevant 
information available to estimate the expected payoff 
from a fight and the final decision is made if and only if 
the evidence suggests that this estimate is positive. In 
the long run this rule should yield a positive payoff to 
an owner on average after repeated encounters with 
random challengers. 
The estimate Fˆ does not include the weighted payoff 
received by an individual when the opponent withdraws 
from conflict, therefore every owner works under the 
assumption that the opponent is always intent to fight. 
This assumption is clearly correct from the perspective 
of the owner because its decision-making takes place 
only after having been challenged. However a rational 
challenger should not always claim, since this ignores 
the probability that the owner will defend the resource 
rather than abandon it uncontested. Therefore a chal-
lenger that always claims should be expected to perform 
worse in the long term (i.e., after repeated encounters 
against random owners) than an owner. The simplified 
model is proposed in this manner, with always-aggres-
sive challengers, in order to determine analytically what 
values of r, c, and VH make internal biases necessary for 
owners to receive the highest long-term payoffs, even 
when these individuals use the rational decision rule 
stated above and when no deception between individu-
als is present. The analysis of this model and the results 
are presented in Section 2.1. 
1.2  The generalized owner-challenger model with 
role-dependent internal and external biases 
In this section we introduce a generalized version of 
the simplified model presented in Section 1.1 in order to 
simulate the scenario where every decision-maker addi-
tionally has an external bias (i.e., a deception bias) that 
alters the capability this individual signals to any oppo-
nent. The larger the external bias the greater the baseline 
capability signalled to competitors. Given any two indi-
viduals, x and y, what x perceives is y's projected capa-
386 Current Zoology Vol. 61  No. 2 
 
bility, distorted first by y's external bias and then by x's 
own perception error. The actual attribute remains un-
changed but y may be able to deceive x into thinking 
that y's capability is greater (or lower) than it actually is, 
thus making x less (or more) willing to fight. The model 
aims to test the theory proposed by Trivers (2011). By 
incorporating the premises of the theory (namely costs 
paid for conscious deception of others) computational 
simulations are run to determine in what circumstances, 
if any, self-deception evolves in order to facilitate the 
deception of opponents. An individual with a non-zero 
external bias exerts a form of deception, or dishonest 
signaling. The use of a positive external bias is similar 
to deimatic behavior, in which an animal, feeling in 
danger, makes a physical display, possibly involving 
changes in shape, position, and/or color, in order to ap-
pear threatening (probably more than the animal actual-
ly is) and to dissuade an opponent from attacking. Ex-
amples of deimatic individuals include some species of 
frog, who, in the presence of a threat, inflate themselves 
with air and raise their hind legs in order to appear larg-
er (Martins, 1989). The dishonest signal sent by an in-
dividual with a positive external bias could also be 
compared to Batesian mimicry, where a harmless indi-
vidual imitates the signals of a harmful one, in order to 
discourage attacks from predators. Examples of Bate-
sian species include Lampropeltis elapsoides, a nonve-
nomous snake who exhibits the color pattern of the ve-
nomous Micrurus fulvius (Kikuchi and Pfennig, 2010). 
In the generalized model each decision-maker has 
two types of bias. An internal bias, denoted by k, that 
influences the perception the individual has of itself (as 
in the simplified model of the previous section), and an 
external bias, denoted by s, that distorts the capability it 
displays to opponents. Both biases comprise together a 
deception pair denoted by [k, s]. Any individual x with 
internal bias kx and external bias sx believes that its own 
capability is Tx + kx and attempts to deceive any poten-
tial opponent y into believing that x's capability is Tx + sx. 
Then what y perceives is a normal deviate of the pro-
jected capability with standard deviation VH, the percep-
tion error size. 
Each decision-maker in the model holds two decep-
tion pairs, [ko, so] and [kc, sc]. The first one of these is 
expressed when the individual is playing the role of an 
owner and the second one when the individual is a 
challenger. The first pair can be referred to as the indi-
vidual's owner biases and the latter as the challenger 
biases. Alternatively the first pair can be referred to as 
the owner strategy of the individual while the second 
pair is the challenger strategy. A strategy is symmetri-
cally biased if its internal and external biases are equal 
otherwise it is asymmetrically biased. Asymmetrical-
ly-biased individuals represent organisms in nature that 
exercise 'conscious' deception because they attempt to 
project an image of themselves that differs from their 
true self-perception. On the other hand, symmetrically-  
biased individuals represent organisms that do not 
deceive or deceive 'unconsciously', because if they 
spread false information it is only because they 'believe' 
it as well. 
In each encounter every individual expresses only the 
pair of biases that match the role (owner or challenger) 
the individual is playing at that moment. Given an own-
er x and a challenger y, x estimates its probability of 
winning as  , ,ˆˆW x y x o xp P kT T   , where ˆ ~y NT  
 , ,y c ys HT V , given that in the encounter this indi-
vidual estimates its capability as Tx + ko,x (with x's inter-
nal owner bias) and that of y as a normal deviate of Ty + 
sc,y (with y's external challenger bias) with perception 
error size VH. On the other hand, y estimates its proba-
bility of winning as  , ,ˆˆW y x y c yp P kT T   , where 
 ,ˆ ~ ,x x o xN s HT T V , given that in the encounter this 
individual estimates its capability as Ty + kc,y (with y's 
internal challenger bias) and that of x as a normal de-
viate of Tx + so,x (with x's external owner bias) with per-
ception error size VH. The owner x estimates its expected 
payoff as     , , ,ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ1x W x W x W xF p r c p c p r c        
and fights if and only if this estimate is positive. Simi-
larly, the challenger y estimates its expected payoff as 
,
ˆ ˆy W yF p r c   and decides to fight if and only if 
ˆ 0yF ! . As explained in Section 1.1, this decision rule 
(i.e., fighting if and only if the estimated payoff is posi-
tive) is rational from the perspective of an owner but not 
necessarily so from the perspective of a challenger. This 
is because for the challenger a rationally estimated 
payoff would necessarily include an estimate of the 
probability of the owner contesting the resource. How-
ever the model becomes difficult to analyze if the chal-
lenger is set to estimate this probability. For this reason 
we consider the simplified scenario where both chal-
lengers and owners use the same rule because the for-
mer can be realistically assumed to be conservative 
when forced to work with imperfect information. In this 
manner the challenger only challenges when it estimates 
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that it can win the resource even if the owner fights 
back. Despite not being rigorously rational this chal-
lenger behavior is sensible and realistic. 
Trivers' premise that deception is more costly in the 
absence of self-deception (Trivers, 2011) is incorporated 
into the model by having each individual pay a con-
scious deception cost that penalizes asymmetrical strate-
gies, regardless of whether a fight actually takes place 
or not. The cost paid by an individual is proportional to 
the discrepancy between the internal and the external 
biases in the strategy exercised by this individual in the 
encounter, with a proportionality constant Oę[0,1]. 
That is to say, the cost paid by the owner x increases 
with the difference between this individual's owner bi-
ases and is given by O|ko,xso,x|, whereas the cost paid 
by the challenger y increases with the difference be-
tween this individual's challenger biases and is given by 
O|kc,ysc,y|. 
Dishonest signaling may serve as a way to avoid the 
cost derived from a physical conflict by discouraging an 
opponent from fighting (an individual with a high ex-
ternal bias may dissuade an opponent from fighting); 
however, in nature such signaling is also costly, even 
though the cost paid in exchange for the ability to cheat 
opponents (e.g., through having to invest in ornamenta-
tion) may be less than the one paid for taking part in a 
fight (e.g., through sustaining an injury) (Backwell et al., 
2000; Zahavi, 1975). This premise is incorporated into 
the model by having each individual pay a dishonest 
signaling cost proportional to the square of the external 
bias in the strategy played by the individual in an en-
counter against an opponent. The proportionality con-
stant is denoted Zę[0,1] and the cost paid by an owner 
x is thus given by 2,o xsZ  whereas the cost paid a chal-
lenger y is given by 2,c ysZ . The conscious deception 
cost and the dishonest signaling cost paid by an indi-
vidual are subtracted from the payoff received by this 
decision-maker from the encounter. For instance, if an 
owner x wins a fight against a challenger y then x's final 
payoff is 2, , ,x o x o x o xF r c k s sO Z     , whereas y's 
is 2, , ,y c y c y c yF c k s sO Z     . Clearly positive fac-
tors O and Z together impose a selective pressure on 
decision-makers driving them towards becoming less 
deceptive and more symmetrically biased. We hypo-
thesize that without the former parameter individuals 
should evolve to be asymmetrically biased whereas 
without the latter individuals should evolve to be maxi-
mally deceptive. Given any two individuals, x and y, y's 
internal bias can evolve so that y disregards the unin-
formative signal originated from x's external bias. In the 
absence of the dishonest signaling cost this would esca-
late, therefore this cost prevents signallers' external bi-
ases and receivers' internal biases from increasing inde-
finitely in an evolutionary arms race. 
A set of evolutionary simulations were run with the 
role-dependent owner-challenger model under Triver's 
premise (i.e., with large enough values of Oand Z) as 
follows. Firstly a population of decision-makers is ini-
tialized randomly with standard normal biases, then 
each generation every individual x is paired at random 
with exactly one adversary y in the population. The fit-
ness of x is calculated as the average of its payoff when 
playing owner and challenger against y, and it increases 
with the resources (each one of these with value r) x 
manages to protect (as an owner) and/or usurp from y 
(as a challenger) and decreases with the number of 
fights x involves itself in (because each fight comes 
with a cost c). The fitness of x depends on the decisions 
this individual makes and how advantageously it influ-
ences the decisions of y, who is also trying to maximize 
its own gain. Fitness proportional selection (Baker, 
1987) is used to determine which individuals reproduce, 
with normally-distributed mutations. Evolution runs 
until no considerable changes are observed and the popu-
lation is assumed to be in equilibrium. Full details of the 
model are presented in the Supplementary Information. 
Results from the model are presented in Section 2.2.  
2  Results 
2.1  Results with the simplified owner-challenger 
model with internal biases 
The expected payoff F(k) of an owner with internal 
bias k depends on the value of the resources contested 
(i.e., r), the cost of each fight (i.e., c), and the error 
made when estimating the capability of an opponent 
(i.e., VH). We approximate this with a numerical method 
described in Appendix A. The expected payoffs for dif-
ferent values of r/c and k when VH = 1 are plotted in 
Figure 2A. The plot shows that the highest payoff is 
obtained by owners with biases near zero when r/c = 2. 
But as this ratio increases it is owners with negative 
biases who receive the highest expected payoffs. There-
fore owners that underestimate their own strength are 
the ones that in the long term perform the best against  
always-aggressive challengers when VH = 1 and the val-
ue of the contested resource (r) outweighs the cost of a 
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confrontation (c). In Appendix B it is formally shown 
that when r/cę(0,1] owners never retaliate against al-
ways-aggressive challengers and end up receiving the 
same payoff (zero), regardless of owners' bias; this is 
because the value of the resource is offset by the cost of 
the inevitable fight. Therefore it can be concluded that 
as long as r/c  1  no owner should perform better than 
the other and no bias can be considered optimal. On the 
other hand, the biases that maximize F(k) when r/cę(1, 
+) were found numerically and plotted in Figure 2B. 
In Appendix B it is shown that any owner i's fighting 
probability is given by pF = P(A > zki), where z is an 
advantage threshold for conflict that depends on r/c and 
VH. It is also shown that if i is an optimal-decision maker 
then pF=1/2. Therefore after a large enough number of 
 
 
 
Fig. 2  A. Owner’s expected payoff (F) in the simplified 
model against random always-aggressive challengers as a 
function of confidence biases (k) and benefit cost ratios (r/c) 
when VH = 1. B. The self-deception biases (k) that yield the 
highest payoffs to an owner in the long term when facing 
random always-aggressive challengers along different 
benefit/cost ratios (r/c) and perception error sizes (VH). 
repeated encounters with random challengers an optimal 
owner should fight back in half of these encounters, 
because P(A>0) = 1/2. This means that given any r/c 
and VH, only owners with biases equal to z may be op-
timal decision-makers because only these have fighting 
probabilities equal to 1/2. This is confirmed by the nu-
merical results displayed in Figure 2B. If VH = 0 then z = 
0 (details in Appendix B) and the highest payoffs are 
received by owners with approximately zero bias. Un-
biased individuals also get the best payoffs when VH > 0 
and r/c = 2 because then z = 0. If VH > 0 then z decreases 
below zero as r/c increases above 2 and therefore nega-
tive owner biases yield the highest payoffs. Additionally 
if VH > 0 then z increases above zero as r/c decreases 
below 2 and owners achieve the maximum gain with 
positive biases. It can be concluded that owners require 
biases to optimize their payoffs if and only if the per-
ception error is present (i.e., if VH > 0). That is to say, 
internal biases serve as a means to compensate for in-
formation noise, given the assumed decision rule. 
2.2  Results with the generalized owner-challenger 
model with role-dependent biases 
We measured the difference between deception and 
self-deception biases when populations were in evolu-
tionary equilibrium in different simulations with differ-
ent values of r/c and VH. If these biases tend to evolve to 
have the same value when it is costly to have them dif-
fer, then this would support the theory proposed by Tri-
vers (2011). Fig. 3 shows the average owner bias dif-
ferences (|ko so|) and the average challenger bias dif-
ferences (|kc sc|) when the population is in evolutio-
nary equilibrium in simulations run with parameters r/c
ę[1, 5], VHę[0,4], Oę{0,0.5,1} and Z= 1. That is to 
say, Figure 3 shows the level of symmetry of owner and 
challenger strategies in equilibrium with (O = 0.5 and 
O= 1) and without (O = 0) Trivers' premise that decep-
tion is more costly to the deceiver when it is uncons-
cious. The plots show that when O > 0 the symmetry in 
owner and challenger strategies generally increases as 
r/c and VH increase together. With high enough values of 
these two parameters the internal and external biases 
evolve to be approximately equal, which is consistent 
with Trivers' theory because as the parameters increase, 
natural selection increasingly favors individuals that 
self-deceive just as much as they deceive others because 
they avoid the cognitive cost of conscious deception, 
and the effects of acting based on false information are 
more than offset by the effects of manipulating others' 
perceptions. Figure 3 also shows that asymmetry can be 
A 
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stable as the perception error decreases and r/c increases. 
That is to say, as higher costs are paid for the ability of 
being consciously deceitful, it pays off more to be an 
unconscious deceiver, unless the perception errors are 
low (allowing the owner to make decisions on more 
certain information) and the value of the contested re-
source greatly outweighs the costs of a fight. 
Fig. 3A shows that if O = 0 then owner bias differ-
ences are generally lowest when r/cę[2,2.5] and they 
increase as r/c increases and decreases away from this 
interval. That is to say, if r/cę[2,2.5] then evolutionary 
equilibrium generally occurs when the population exer-
cise owner strategies that are symmetrically biased (i.e.,  
when owners are unconscious deceivers), otherwise 
equilibrium generally occurs when the population exer-
cise owner strategies that are symmetrically unbiased 
(i.e., when owners are conscious deceivers). The figure 
also shows that owner bias differences increase and 
decrease with VH. This means that as the information 
available becomes noisier then it pays off more to be an  
asymmetrically-biased owner (i.e., a consciously-decei-
ving owner). A similar pattern occurs in challenger 
strategies, as shown in Fig. 3B, although the bias dif-
ferences observed in these strategies when the popula-
tion is in evolutionary equilibrium are generally higher. 
That is to say, differences in challenger strategies in- 
 
 
 
Fig. 3  Differences between internal (self-deception) and external (deception) biases evolved with different benefit/cost   
ratios (r/c), perception errors (VH), with fixed conscious deception costs (O) and a fixed dishonest signaling cost (Z= 1). 
With each combination of these parameters, evolutionary simulations are run with populations composed of individuals with role-dependent biases. 
When equilibrium is reached the average difference of owner biases ( o ok s ) and the average difference of challenger biases ( c ck s ) in the 
population are calculated and plotted. These plots show values of r/c and VH with which symmetrical (darker blue) and asymmetrical (darker red) 
strategies are stable. As conscious deception costs increase differences between internal and external biases tend to decrease towards zero. 
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crease with VH and as r/c increases and decreases away 
from [2,3.5]. All the above is similar to what is ob-
served in Figure 2B where the magnitude of optimal 
internal bias exhibit a similar relationship with r/c and 
VH, i.e., higher magnitudes as r/c increases and decreas-
es from 2 and as VH increases. It is reasonable to assume 
that this similarity is due to the same causes (i.e., in-
formation noise) although a formal demonstration of 
this (such as the one provided for the simplified model 
in Section 2.1) is difficult in the generalized model with 
role-dependent biases. 
Additional evolutionary simulations were run with 
the same parameters with external biases absent. The 
purpose of this was to compare the evolved internal 
biases in owner and challenger strategies in the absence 
and presence of external biases. The difference in mag 
nitude of internal biases in equilibrium when these 
evolve in the presence and absence of external biases 
was measured by running separate evolutionary simula-
tions with (so, sc  0) and then without (so, sc = 0) de-
ception biases. Individuals pay a conscious deception 
cost (O = 1) and a dishonest signaling cost (Z = 1) only 
in simulations where external biases are present. The 
average internal bias in owner strategies when the popu-
lation is in evolutionary equilibrium in simulations with 
external biases is denoted by 1|
d
ok O and the average 
internal bias in challenger strategies is denoted by 
1|
d
ck O . The average internal bias in owner strategies 
when individuals are in evolutionary equilibrium in 
simulations without external biases is denoted by 
0|
nd
ok O  and the average internal bias in challenger stra-
tegies is denoted by 0|
nd
ck O . The difference between 
evolved internal biases with and without external biases 
( 1 0| |
d nd
o ok kO O   and 1 0| |d ndc ck kO O   ) for each 
choice of r/c and VH are plotted in Fig. 4. The two plots 
show that there are values of r/c and VH for which these 
differences are generally positive and that these differ-
ences tend to increase as r/c and VH increase. This im-
plies that with high enough values of r/c and VH the magni-
tude of the evolved internal biases increases in the pre-
sence of external biases, which means that the ability to 
deceive others requires an increase in self-deception in 
order to be evolutionarily stable. It can be hypothesized 
that the internal biases that evolve without external bi-
ases do so for a reason similar to the one explained in 
Section 2.1 for the simplified model with always-aggres-
sive challengers (i.e., noise in the information available), 
although a formal demonstration of this is harder in the 
generalized model with role-dependent biases. 
In evolutionary simulations with both internal and 
external biases where individuals are forced to pay a 
cost for the ability of conscious deception (i.e., for ex-
ercising asymmetrical strategies) there is a difference in 
the magnitude of the internal biases that evolve com-
pared to the internal biases evolved in the absence of 
this cost, as shown in Fig. 5. The average internal bias  
 
 
 
Fig. 4  Difference between internal (self-deception) biases 
evolved in the presence and absence of external biases 
When external biases are present, individuals pay a conscious decep-
tion cost (O = 1) and a dishonest signaling cost (Z = 1). The notations 
0|
nd
ok O  and 0|
nd
ck O  are used to refer to the average internal bias 
in owner and challenger strategies, respectively, in populations in 
evolutionary equilibrium when individuals evolve with no external 
biases (i.e., when so,x, sc,x = 0 for every individual x). The notations 
1|
d
ok O  and 1|
d
ck O  are used to refer to the average internal bias in 
owner and challenger strategies, respectively, in populations in evolu-
tionary equilibrium when individuals evolve with external biases. 
Figure 4A shows the owner difference 1 0| |
d nd
o ok kO O    for different 
benefit/cost ratios (r/c) and perception errors (VH), whereas Figure 4B 
shows the challenger difference 1 0| |
d nd
c ck kO O   . The plots show that 
these differences tend to increase with r/c and VH. This implies that as 
these parameters increase, an increase in the ability to deceive others 
(from zero external bias to nonzero external bias) requires an increase 
in the magnitude of self-deception in order to be stable. 
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in the equilibrium population is measured when indi-
viduals evolve with (O= 1) and without (O = 0) paying a 
cost for conscious deception and then the differences 
between these averages is calculated for each choice of 
r/c and VH. The two plots in Fig. 5 show that these dif-
ferences tend to increase with r/c and VH and that they 
are generally above zero with high enough values of 
these two parameters. This implies that the magnitude 
of the self-deception that evolves under the influence of 
the conscious-deception cost tends to become larger 
than the self-deception that evolves without this cost as  
 
 
 
Fig. 5  Differences in the magnitude of internal biases 
evolved with (O = 1) and without (O = 0) conscious decep-
tion costs 
In both plots the dishonest signaling cost is Z = 1. The average owner 
internal bias evolved in the presence of external biases when O = 1 is 
denoted by 1|
d
ok O and the same average when O = 0 is denoted 
by 0|
d
ok O . The average challenger internal bias evolved in the pres-
ence of external biases when O = 1 is denoted by 1|dck O and the same 
average when O = 0 is denoted by 0|dck O . The plots show that the 
differences 1 0| |
d d
o ok kO O    and 0 1| |d dc ck kO O   are generally non-
zero and that they increase with r/c and VH. This implies that internal 
biases evolved with conscious deception costs (i.e., with O = 1) tend to 
become larger than internal biases evolved without this assumption 
(i.e., when O = 0) as r/c and VH increase. 
r/c and VH increase. That is to say, with high enough 
values of r/c and VH, self-deception is effectively higher 
under Trivers' premise that conscious deception is costly 
(Trivers, 2011). In addition to this, self-deception evo-
lved under Trivers' premise increases as the information 
decision-makers use becomes noisier (i.e., asVH increa-
ses) and as the value of the contested resource grows 
relative to the cost of a fight (i.e., as r/c increases). 
3  Discussion 
The owner-challenger model extends the one pro-
posed by Johnson and Fowler (Johnson and Fowler, 
2011) and offers two improvements over the original 
model. The first is that resources are never left un-
claimed and the second is that individuals use a rational 
decision rule by taking into account the costs and bene-
fits of each decision. Two versions of the model are 
considered: (1) the model with internal biases, intro-
duced in Section 1.1, and (2) the model with role-    
dependent internal and external biases, introduced in 
Section 1.2. The model with internal biases aims to de-
termine the evolvability of self-deceptive cognitive bi-
ases, given that decision-makers use a rational decision 
rule. The model with role-dependent internal and exter-
nal biases introduces dishonest signaling and aims to 
test the theory proposed by Trivers, which states that 
self-deception should evolve if individuals face a selec-
tive pressure to deceive each other and that self-decei-
ving deceivers have an evolutionary advantage over 
other deceitful individuals because the former do not 
have to pay the cognitive costs of concealing a lie con-
sciously. The baseline results with the owner-challenger 
model with internal biases introduced in Section 1.1 
show that, given an assumed optimal decision rule tak-
ing proper account of probabilities costs and benefits of 
outcomes, suggested by Marshall et al. (2013b), biases 
provide a way for owners in the model to compensate 
for perception errors when their opponents are certain to 
fight. This is illustrated in Figure 2B, where it is shown 
that if there are perception errors (VH > 0) then optimal 
behavior requires non-zero biases, the sole exception 
being when r/c =2. If errors are not present (VH = 0) then 
owners do not require any biases to behave optimally. 
But if errors are present then self-deception biases are 
required to gain the best payoffs in the long term. These 
results provided a baseline optimal level of self-decep-
tion to compare the extended model against. 
The extended owner-challenger model with role-de-
pendent internal and external biases was introduced in 
Section 1.2 with the purpose of examining the evolution 
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of self-deception as a supporting mechanism of decep-
tion. Symmetrically-biased individuals are those who 
self-deceive just as much as they attempt to deceive 
others, and can be considered to be 'unconscious' de-
ceivers. On the other hand asymmetrically-biased indi-
viduals are those who project an image of themselves 
that differs from their self-perception, and are analogous 
to 'conscious' deceivers. The premise of Trivers' theory 
was incorporated into the model by having each deci-
sion-maker pay a dishonest signaling cost (for having 
the ability to deceive others through external biases) and 
a conscious deception cost (for exercising asymmetri-
cally-biased strategies, i.e., for being consciously de-
ceitful), emulating the physiological costs that deceivers 
in nature have to pay, according to Trivers' proposal 
(Trivers, 2011). Evolutionary simulations with the mod-
el show that when these costs are present then symme-
trically-biased, self-deceiving individuals are more 
evolutionarily successful than those who attempt to 
deceive others while attempting to act on truthful in-
formation, when the benefit/cost ratio and the percep-
tion error are high enough (Figure 3). In other words, 
self-deceiving deceivers are more likely to evolve as the 
benefit/cost ratio and the perception error increase, 
when the conscious deception and dishonest signaling 
costs are present. The internal biases evolved when in-
dividuals attempt to deceive others generally exceed 
those that are evolved when individuals cannot deceive 
others (Figure 4), as information becomes noisier (i.e., 
as VH increases) and the benefit/cost ratio becomes larg-
er. That is to say, in order to be evolutionarily stable, an 
increase in deceitful behavior requires an increase in 
self-deceiving behavior when there are physiological 
costs for exercising deception and for doing so con-
sciously. Further simulations show that internal biases 
are also generally higher when there is a conscious de-
ception cost (i.e., when O = 1) than when this cost is 
absent (i.e., when O = 0), and also that the difference 
between the internal biases evolved with and without 
this cost generally increases with r/c and VH (Figure 5). 
From these numerical experiments it can be concluded 
that Trivers' theory generally holds true in situations of 
conflict if two conditions are met. First, the value of the 
contested resource must sufficiently exceed the cost of 
the fight required to claim the resource. Second, there 
must be a high enough degree of uncertainty in the in-
formation the decision-maker uses to assess its chances 
of winning the fight. As the value of the resource and 
the uncertainty increase, from the perspective of an in-
dividual it tends to payoff more in the long term to 
self-deceive as much as to attempt to deceive others, 
when conscious deception and dishonest signaling are 
physiologically costly. Then it should be expected that 
when these conditions are met, self-deceiving fighters 
evolve, as predicted by Trivers' theory (von Hippel and 
Trivers, 2011a; Marshall et al., 2013b). 
The theory by Trivers has received has received con-
siderable discussion, and it is possible that it will con-
tinue to be debated whether this theory correctly ex-
plains the apparent self-deception biases observed in 
humans, such as the ones presented in the introduction. 
The model presented in this article aims to test this 
theory in the particular case of a situation of conflict. 
The motivation for proposing this model is the point 
raised by commentators that the risk of injury faced by a 
self-deceiving, deceitful fighter is likely to be higher 
than the benefit received from discouraging an oppo-
nent from fighting by means of a deceitful exhibition of 
strength, and that therefore self-deceiving deceivers 
should not evolve. The model presented in this article 
simulates a situation of conflict where it is shown that, 
under the premises of the theory, self-deceiving, deceit-
ful fighters do evolve. Given this, the model we have 
proposed serves as a first attempt to formally address 
the evolution of self-deception in situations of conflict, 
and the results obtained complement Trivers' proposal 
(von Hippel and Trivers, 2011a; Marshall et al., 2013b). 
In the future it would be of interest to examine the im-
pact of more biologically-realistic assumptions on this 
result, such as population variation in perception errors, 
costs of conflict and so on. 
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Supplementary Information 
 
1  Details of the Evolutionary Model Presented in the Main Document 
The evolutionary model used in Section 1.2 of the main document (Self-deception can evolve under appropriate costs) is as fol-
lows. A population of 500 individuals with role-dependent biases is initialized with random standard normal biases. Every genera-
tion the population is assorted in such a way that every individual x is paired at random with exactly one adversary y in the popula-
tion. The capability difference between x and y (denoted by A) is a randomly-chosen standard normal value. Two encounters be-
tween x and y are simulated. In the first encounter x plays owner and y plays challenger. In the second encounter the roles are in-
verted. In each encounter each individual expresses only the biases corresponding to the role played by the individual. That is to say, 
when x plays the role of an owner it estimates its own capability as Tx + ko,x and attempts to deceive y into believing that x’s capabil-
ity is Tx + so,x. On the other hand, when x plays the role of a challenger it estimates its own capability as Tx + kc,x and attempts to 
project onto y a capability equal toTx + sc,x. The biases of y are expressed analogously. The fitness of x is calculated as the average 
of the payoff received by this individual in the two encounters. The fitness of y is calculated in the same manner. 
One half of the population are selected through stochastic universal sampling (Baker, 1987). A new population is formed con-
sisting of the selected individuals. Those that fail to be selected are replaced by randomly-chosen copies of the selected ones to 
complete the new population. Nearly 1% of the new population members have their genetically-encoded biases mutated with Gaus-
sian noise. Evolution runs until the 5,000-th generation, when no considerable changes are observed and the population is assumed 
to be in equilibrium. 
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2  Implementation of the Model Presented in the Main Document 
The source code that implements the model presented in Section 1.1 and the generalized model presented in Section 1.2 of the 
main document (Self-deception can evolve under appropriate costs) can be found in the compressed archive Sources.zip down-
loadable from http://goo.gl/FIqLzP. These sources were written in the R programming language (version 3.0.2) and Matlab (version 
8.1.0.604). The operating system used was Scientific Linux release 6.5 (Carbon). 
The simplified model with only internal biases and always-aggressive challengers described in Section 1.1 of the main document 
and the numerical analysis described in Section 2.1 are implemented in source file Model_1.R whereas the generalized model with 
role-dependent internal and external biases described in Section 1.2 and the simulations and numerical analyses described in Sec-
tion 2.2 are implemented in source file Model_2.R. These sources are adaptations from the R code by Johnson and Fowler (2011). 
The Matlab source files SurfacePlot.m, SurfacePlot2.m and SurfacePlot3.m are used for producing the plots in the main docu-
ment (Fig. 2, 3, 4 and 5 in Self-deception can evolve under appropriate costs) from data generated by the R source code. Section 3 
of this Online Supplementary Information presents the instructions for producing these plots using the sources in the compressed 
archive Sources.zip downloadable from http://goo.gl/FIqLzP. 
3  Instructions for Producing the Plots Presented in the Main Document 
3.1  Figure 2 
Fig. 2A in the main document is produced following the steps below. 
(1) Executing function Model_1_1() in the R source file Model_1.R, which outputs the data file Expected_payoffs.csv. 
(2) Executing function SurfacePlot() in Matlab source file SurfacePlot.m in the same directory as Expected_payoffs.csv. The plot 
is output in the same directory as a file named Expected_payoffs.pdf. 
Fig. 2B is produced by running function Model_1_2() in the R source file Model_1.R. The plot is output in the same directory as a 
file named optimal owner_biases.pdf. 
3.2  Figure 3 
Fig. 3A and Fig. 3B in the main document are produced following the steps below. 
(1) Running Model_2_1() in the R source file Model_2.R, which outputs a folder named Model_2_1 containing two .csv files 
named 1_owners.csv and 2_challengers.csv. In order to generate these two files, the program needs to output several aux-
iliary files into this folder first. While the program is running the size of the folder can reach over 300 MB, but these aux-
iliary files are deleted by the program upon completion. 
(2) Running the Matlab source file SurfacePlot2.m in the same directory as 1_owners.csv and 2_challengers.csv (these two files 
can copied from folder Model_2_1). This program reads the two .csv files and produces the plots. The plots are output in the 
same directory as two files named owners_sf_plot.pdf and challengers_sf_plot.pdf. 
Fig. 3C and Fig. 3D in the main document are produced following the steps below. 
(1) Running Model_2_2() in the R source file Model_2.R, which outputs a folder named Model_2_2 containing two .csv files 
named 1_owners.csv and 2_challengers.csv. In order to generate these two files, the program needs to output several aux-
iliary files into this folder first. While the program is running the size of the folder can reach over 100 MB, but these aux-
iliary files are deleted by the program upon completion. 
(2) Running the Matlab source file SurfacePlot2.m in the same directory as 1_owners.csv and 2_challengers.csv (these two files 
can copied from folder Model_2_2). This program reads the two .csv files and produces the plots. The plots are output in the 
same directory as two files named owners_sf_plot.pdf and challengers_sf_plot.pdf. 
Fig. 3E and Fig. 3F in the main document are produced following the steps below. 
(1) Running Model_2_3() in the R source file Model_2.R, which outputs a folder named Model_2_3 containing two .csv files 
named 1_owners.csv and 2_challengers.csv. In order to generate these two files, the program needs to output several aux-
iliary files into this folder first. While the program is running the size of the folder can reach over 100 MB, but these aux-
iliary files are deleted by the program upon completion. 
(2) Running the Matlab source file SurfacePlot2.m in the same directory as 1_owners.csv and 2_challengers.csv (these two files 
can copied from folder Model_2_3). This program reads the two .csv files and produces the plots. The plots are output in the 
same directory as two files named owners_sf_plot.pdf and challengers_sf_plot.pdf. 
3.3  Figure 4 
Fig. 4A and Fig. 4B in the main document are produced following the steps below. 
(1) Running Model_2_4() in the R source file Model_2.R, which outputs a folder named Model_2_4 containing two .csv files 
named 1_owners.csv and 2_challengers.csv. 
(2) Running the Matlab source file SurfacePlot3.m in the same directory as 1_owners.csv and 2_challengers.csv (these two files 
can copied from folder Model_2_3). This program reads the two .csv files and produces the plots. The plots are output in the 
same directory as two files named owners_sf_plot.pdf and challengers_sf_plot.pdf. 
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3.4  Figure 5 
Fig. 5A and Fig. 5B in the main document are produced following the steps below. 
(1) Running Model_2_5() in the R source file Model_2.R, which outputs a folder named Model_2_5 containing two .csv files 
named 1_owners.csv and 2_challengers.csv. 
(2) Running the Matlab source file SurfacePlot3.m in the same directory as 1_owners.csv and 2_challengers.csv (these two files 
can copied from folder Model_2_3). This program reads the two .csv files and produces the plots. The plots are output in the 
same directory as two files named owners_sf_plot.pdf and challengers_sf_plot.pdf. 
Appendix A: Expected payoff of an owner in the simplified model (Section 1.1) 
The expected payoff of any owner with internal bias k is calculated as a function of k, as 
       ˆ , 0W
A SA
F k P A I p A k c r I A r c

 ª ! º ª !  º¬ ¼ ¬ ¼¦  
This function approximates the owner's payoff as a summation of the weighted partial payoffs the owner receives in simulated 
encounters with challengers in a set SA of uniformly sampled values of A. The weighting factor is the probability of each A, denoted 
by P(A). Each partial payoff in the summation is expressed in terms of an auxiliary identity function of the form I(Cx), which re-
turns unity if the condition represented by Cx holds true and zero otherwise. The expression  ˆ ,Wp A k denotes the individual's esti-
mated probability of winning, given A and kķ. Partial payoffs are added in the calculation of expected payoff if and only if 
 ˆ ,Wp A k r c! , i.e., if the owner decides to fight back. The partial payoff is rc if the owner is stronger than its opponent in the 
simulated owner-challenger encounter and c otherwise. 
Appendix B: Optimal owner behavior in the simplified model (Section 1.1) 
In the model introduced in Section 1.1 it holds that if an owner i accepts an opponent j's challenge then the marginal probability 
that i defeats j is given by pW = P (Ti > Tj) = P (A > 0) = 1/2 and therefore an owner's expected payoff from a single fight is 1/2rc. 
An unsophisticated owner that ignores relevant information and fights randomly each time with fighting probability pF is then ex-
pected to receive a mean payoff Fmin = pF (1/2rc) after repeated encounters with random challengers. Owners in this model, how-
ever, choose to fight only when their estimated expected payoff is positive, therefore their payoffs in the long term should be higher 
than Fmin. Theorem 1 shows that an owner may fight only if r/c is in the interval (1, +). In addition to this, Theorem 2 shows that 
for each r/c there is a capability superiority threshold for conflict, denoted by z, and that every owner i decides to repel a challenger 
if and only if A > zki. Thus the fighting probability of an owner with bias ki is given by pF = P (A > zki) and it increases as r/c and 
ki increase and as z and c/r decrease. 
Theorem 1: When r/cę(0,1] an owner never fights back. 
Proof: If r/cę(0,1] then c/rę[1, +) and ˆWp can never be above c/r. Therefore the owner's decision rule (i.e., “fight back if 
and only if ˆWp >c/r”) is never satisfied. 
 
Theorem 2: Every owner i fights j if and only if Ti + ki > Tj + z where z, the capability superiority threshold for conflict, is the 
solution to the equation  z x dx c rf c)  ³ and )ƍ(x) is the density function of a normal distribution with mean zero and standard 
deviation VH. 
 
Proof: From the fact that  ˆˆW j i ip P kT T   and  ˆ ~ ,j jN HT T V it follows that  ˆ ki iWp x dxT 
f
 )³ , where )(x) is the density 
function of the normally-distributed ˆ
j
T . Let v be the solution to equation  v x dx c r
f
)  ³ and let z = vTj. Therefore ˆWp !  
c r (i.e., the owner fights back) if and only if Ti + ki > v = Tj + z, where z satisfies the equation      
zjv z
c
x dx x dx x dx
r
T 
f f f
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ķ The estimate  ˆ ,Wp A k  is given by    ˆ ˆ 0j i j iP k P kT T T T      . Since ˆ jT  is normally distributed with mean Tj and standard deviation 
VH then the sum ˆ j i kT T   is normally distributed with mean j i kT T  and standard deviationVH. Therefore  ˆ 0j iP kT T   can be res-
tated as  0P 4  , where  ~ ,N A k H4 V  . 
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and ĭƍ(x) is the density function of a normal distribution with mean zero and standard deviation VH. 
Marshall et al. (2013b) show that an optimally-behaving individual in J&F's model (Johnson and Fowler, 2011) whose opponent 
is known to fight necessarily retaliates if its marginal probability of winning satisfies the inequality pW > c/r. An optimal owner in 
the owner-challenger model presented in Section 1.1 should exhibit exactly the same behavior because its decision is made only in 
the knowledge that its opponent is determined to fight. If every owner had access to perfect information it would be able to compute 
accurately its probability of winning and follow the decision rule “fight if and only if pW > c/r” (Marshall et al., 2013b). However, 
each owner only has access to its own estimated probability of winning ( ˆWp ), which is likely to deviate from the actual value (pW) 
due to the individual's perception error (VH) and internal bias (k). The individual uses this information to make a rational decision 
but due to the uncertainty present it is possible that at some point the individual makes the wrong choice. 
Given any randomly selected owner i and challenger j, then by definition i's marginal probability of winning is pW = P(A>0) = 
1/2 and this means i is objectively expected to be stronger than half the opponents it encounters. Therefore an optimal owner i that 
hypothetically takes part in repeated encounters with random challengers should decide to fight in approximately half of those en-
counters, otherwise i would be missing opportunities to defeat and increase its fitness; or it would risk itself in fights that are bound 
to be lost, which would in turn have a detrimental effect on its long term fitness. Then it can be predicted that the owners with the 
highest long-term payoffs must have internal biases that make pF equal to 1/2. That is to say, optimal behavior is a sufficient (but 
not necessary) condition for pF = 1/2. Similarly, a fighting probability pF = 1/2 is a necessary (but not sufficient) condition of opti-
mality. 
 
 
  
 
